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ABSTRACT

The cloud computing is an emerging model in which computing infrastructure resources are provided as a service over the Internet. Data owners can
outsource their data by remotely storing them in the cloud and enjoy on-demand
high quality services from a shared pool of configurable computing resources. By
using these data storage services, the data owners can relieve the burden of local
data storage and maintenance. However, since data owners and the cloud servers
are not in the same trusted domain, the outsourced data may be at risk as the
cloud server may no longer be fully trusted. Therefore, data integrity is of critical
importance in such a scenario. Cloud should let the owners or a trusted third
party to check for the integrity of their data storage without demanding a local
copy of the data. Owners often replicate their data on the cloud servers across
multiple data centers to provide a higher level of scalability, availability, and durability. When the data owners ask the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to replicate
data, they are charged a higher storage fee by the CSP. Therefore, the data owners
need to be strongly convinced that the CSP is storing data copies agreed on in the
service level contract, and data-updates have been correctly executed on all the
remotely stored copies. In this thesis, a Dynamic Multi-Replica Provable Data
Possession scheme (DMR-PDP) is proposed that prevents the CSP from cheating;
for example, by maintaining fewer copies than paid for and/or tampering data.
In addition, we also extended the scheme to support a basic file versioning system
where only the difference between the original file and the updated file is propagated rather than the propagation of operations for privacy reasons. DMR-PDP
also supports efficient dynamic operations like block modification, insertion and
deletion on replicas over the cloud servers.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing is an innovative and enticing technology by which highly
scalable and technology enabled services can be easily consumed over the Internet. The advantages of cloud computing include on-demand self-service, ubiquitous network access, location independent resource pooling, usage-based pricing,
etc. Its great exibility and economic savings are motivating both individuals and
enterprises e.g., Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo, and Salesforce to outsource
their data into the cloud. But concerns on data availability and security are preventing data owners and companies from taking advantage of the cloud. When
users store data in the cloud, their main concern is whether the cloud can maintain
data integrity and whether the data can be recovered when there is data loss or
server failure. Cloud Service Providers (CSP), in order to save storage cost, may
tend to discard some data or data copies that are not accessed often, or mitigate
such data to the second-level storage devices. CSPs may also conceal data loss
due to management faults, hardware failures or attacks. Therefore, a critical issue
in storing data at untrusted CSPs is periodically verifying whether the storage
servers maintain data integrity and store data completely and correctly as stated
in the Service Level Agreement (SLA).

1.1. DATA REPLICATION AND CHALLENGES
Data Replication is a commonly used technique to increase the data availability in the cloud computing. Cloud replicates the data and stores them strategically on multiple servers located at various geographic locations. Since the replicated data are copies, it is difficult to verify whether the cloud really stores multiple
copies of the data. The cloud can easily cheat the owner by storing only one copy
of the data. Thus, the owner would like to verify at regular intervals whether
the cloud indeed possesses multiple copies of the data as claimed in the SLA. In
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general, the cloud has the capability to generate multiple replicas when a data
owner challenges the CSP to prove that it possesses multiple copies of the data.
Also, it is a valid assumption that the owner of the data may not have a copy of
the data stored locally. So, the major task of the owner is not only to verify that
the data is intact but also to recover the data if any deletions/corruptions of data
are identified. If the owner, during his verification, detects some data loss in any
of the replicas in the cloud, he can recover the data from other replicas that are
stored intact. Since, the replicas are to be stored at diverse geographic locations,
it is assumed to be safe that the data loss will not occur at all the replicas at the
same time.

1.2. MOTIVATION
Data owners outsource their data to the cloud and may not physically
possess a local copy of their data. The data owners should be able to verify that
the data with the data stored at the CSP is intact and secure. Cloud should let
either users or a user trusted third party to audit the cloud data storage without
demanding the local copy of data. These are the factors that need to be considered
while designing a scheme that verifies data integrity.
• Communication complexity. The amount of communication between client
and server should be minimal.
• Storage cost. Additional storage of client and server required by the scheme
should be minimal apart from the original data.
• Data recovery. The scheme should help in data recovery in case of data loss.
• Provable security. The scheme should be secure.

3
2. RELATED WORK

In this section, a review of significant works in the literature on data integrity verification is presented.

2.1. BASIC APPROACH
One basic approach to verify data integrity is to hash the entire file before
storing it on the cloud. The hash is computed by the data owner and is stored
locally. When client wants to verify, he downloads the entire file, computes the
hash, and verifies if the values match. But this scheme has the drawbacks of
downloading and hashing the entire file every time. This scheme is effective if the
file size is less and becomes an overhead for files of huge sizes.
There are two types of schemes that are discussed extensively in the literature, which offer better solution than the basic approach. They are Provable
Data Possession (PDP) [1] and Proof of Retrievability (POR) [4]. PDP schemes
only checks whether the data stored in the CSP is intact whereas POR schemes
help the data owner to recover the data in case of data failure.

2.2. HOMOMORPHIC VERIFIABLE TAGS
Ateniese et al [1] proposed this scheme data owner preprocesses the file
before storing it on the cloud. They introduce the concept of Homomorphic Verifiable Tags (HVTs). Tags generation is based on RSA signature scheme. Consider
a file F to be a finite ordered collection of n blocks, F = (m1 , m2 ,.., mn ). Given
a message m, the client computes tag Tm . These tags will be stored on the cloud
together with file F. These homomorphic verifiable tags act as verification metadata for the file blocks. Because of the homomorphic property, tags computed for
multiple file blocks can be combined into a single value. Given two values Tmi
and Tmj , anyone can combine them into a value Tmi +mj corresponding to the sum
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of the messages mi + mj . At a later time, the client can verify that the server
possesses the file by generating a random challenge against a randomly selected
set of file blocks. Using the queried blocks and their corresponding tags, the server
generates a proof of possession. The client is thus convinced of data possession,
without actually having to retrieve file blocks. The disadvantages of this scheme
are that, it does not consider data encryption and data replication. This scheme
works only for static files.

2.3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING PDP SCHEME
Shah et al.[11] proposed privacy-preserving PDP protocols. Using this
scheme, an external Third Party Auditor (TPA) can verify the integrity of files
stored by a remote server without knowing any of the file contents. The data
owner first encrypts the file, and then sends both the encrypted file along with
the encryption key to the remote server. Moreover, the data owner sends the
encrypted file along with a key-commitment that fixes a value for the key without
revealing the key to the TPA. The primary purpose of this scheme is to ensure that
the remote server is correctly possessing clients data along with the encryption key,
and to prevent any information leakage to the TPA which is responsible for the
auditing task. Since key should be kept secret from both the auditor and the
cloud, the data owner places a key commitment gk instead of storing k on the
server. The auditor generates n random numbers and generates MAC values for
random blocks and stores it. Periodically the auditor issues a challenge to the
server by generating a random block number for which the server generates MAC
for that block and sends it back to the auditor for verification. This scheme has a
lot of disadvantages. The number of times a particular data item can be verified
is limited and must be fixed beforehand. TPA has to regenerate a new list of
hash values to achieve unbounded number of audits. Lack of support for stateless
verification, i.e., the TPA has to update its state between audits to prevent using
the same random number or the same MAC twice.
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2.4. MULTIPLE REPLICA PROVABLE DATA POSSESSION SCHEME
Curtmola [6] proposed Multiple-Replica PDP (MR-PDP) scheme where a
data owner can verify that several copies of a file are stored by a storage service
provider. The MR-PDP scheme is an extension to the PDP models proposed by
Ateniese. Curtmola proposed creating distinct replicas/copies of the data file by
first encrypting the file then masking the encrypted version with some randomness
generated from a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF). Different PRF keys are used
to generate multiple data copies. RSA signatures are used for tag generation. RSA
signatures have holomorphic property where multiple data blocks can be verified
at the same time. The main advantage of this scheme is that it proves the integrity
of multiple replicas. The disadvantages are the data is not encrypted, the size of
RSA signatures is huge, deals with static data, and the authorized users have to
know which copy has been specifically retrieved from the CSP to properly unmask
it before decryption.

2.5. DYNAMIC PROVABLE DATA POSSESSION
This scheme [7] tries to solve the certain limitations of MRPDP scheme by
using a rank based authenticated skip list. This data structure is used to verify
the integrity of the data. According to this scheme, a file F is split into n blocks
m1 , m2 ,..., mn . The tag T(mi ) of block mi is stored at the i-th bottom-level node
of the skip list. Block mi will be stored elsewhere by the cloud. Each node v of the
skip list stores the number of nodes at the bottom level that can be reached from
v. This value is called the rank of v and denote it with r(v). The figure below
shows a skip list with ranks of nodes. An insertion, deletion, or modification of a
file block affects only the nodes of the skip list along a search path. Ranks of the
affected nodes are computed bottom-up in constant time.
The top leftmost node of a skip list will be referred to as the start node.
For a node v the indices of the leftmost and rightmost nodes at the bottom level
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Figure 2.1. Rank Based Skip List

reachable from v, is denoted by low(v) and high(v) respectively. At each level
based on certain conditions each node will also store the collective hash value of
the nodes from left to right in the bottom level in this way h(x1 ,.., xk ) = h(h(x1 )
k...k h(xk )). Where k denote a concatenation operator. These hash entries act
as metadata. Whenever a file block is updated or modified, the hash value of
the nodes in this skip list from which the updated or modified node is reachable
is recomputed and the path where the nodes are updated is sent to the user for
verification. The integrity verification scheme is similar to the earlier schemes but
this scheme supports data dynamics and verifies data block insert, update and
modify operations.

2.6. ON VERIFYING DYNAMIC MULTIPLE DATA COPIES OVER
CLOUD SERVERS
This scheme [8] supports multiple replicas and data encryption. The data
blocks in each copy are appended to file blocks before encryption. AES encryption
scheme is used for data encryption and BLS signatures are used for tag generation. Dynamic data operations are supported with the help of Merkle Hash Trees
(MHT).
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Figure 2.2. Merkle Hash Tree

A MHT is a binary tree structure used to efficiently verify the integrity of
the data. The MHT is a tree of hashes where leaves of the tree are the hashes of
the data blocks. In the above figure hA = h(h1 k h2 ), hB = h(h3 k h4 ), and so on.
Finally, hR = h(hE k hF ) is the hash of the root node that is used to authenticate
the integrity of all data blocks. The data blocks {b1 , b2 ,..,b8 } are stored on a
remote server, and only the authentic value hR is stored locally on the verifier
side. For example, if the verifier requests to check the integrity of the blocks b2
and b6 , the server will send these two blocks along with the authentication paths
A2 = {h1 , hB } and A6 = {h5 , hD } that are used to reconstruct the root of the MHT.
Aj the authentication path of bj is a set of node siblings (grey-shaded circles) on
the path from hj to the root. In the dynamic behavior of outsourced data, both
the values and the positions of the data block needs to be authenticated. This
will give an assurance that a specific value is stored at a specific leaf node. For
example, if a data owner requires inserting a new block after position j, the verifier
needs to make sure that the server has inserted the new block in the requested
position. To validate the positions of the blocks, the leaf nodes of the MHT are
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treated in a specific sequence, e.g., left-to-right sequence. So, the hash of any
internal node is h(left child k right child), e.g., hA = h(h1 k h2 ) 6= h(h2 k h1 ).
Besides, the authentication path Aj is viewed as an ordered set, and thus any leaf
node is uniquely specified by following the used sequence of constructing the root
of the MHT. A MHT directory is constructed for all the replicas.

Figure 2.3. MHT Directory
The disadvantage of this scheme is that the number of nodes in MHT depends on number of blocks in the file and also on the number of copies. If a file
has huge number of blocks, then number of nodes in MHT will be huge. This
scheme incurs computation and communication overhead to the data owner to
generate and send such a huge tree structure. For every verification, the authentication paths and multiple hash values are also sent to the user which will create
a communication overhead to data owner.
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REPLICATED DATA INTEGRITY VERIFICATION IN CLOUD

Raghul Mukundan1 , Sanjay Madria1 , Mark Linderman2
1

Department of Computer Science, Missouri University of Science & Technology,
Rolla, MO 65409
2

Air Force Research Lab, Rome, NY

ABSTRACT
Cloud computing is an emerging model in which computing infrastructure
resources are provided as a service over the Internet. Data owners can outsource
their data by remotely storing them in the cloud and enjoy on-demand high quality
applications and services from a shared pool of configurable computing resources.
However, since data owners and cloud servers are not in the same trusted domain,
the outsourced data may be at risk as the cloud server may no longer be fully
trusted. Therefore, data integrity is of critical importance in such a scenario.
Cloud should let either the owners or a trusted third party to audit their data
storage without demanding a local copy of the data from owners. Replicating data
on cloud servers across multiple data centers provides a higher level of scalability,
availability, and durability. When the data owners ask the Cloud Service Provider
(CSP) to replicate data at different servers, they are charged a higher fee by the
CSP. Therefore, the data owners need to be strongly convinced that the CSP is
storing all the data copies that are agreed upon in the service level contract, and
the data-update requests issued by the customers have been correctly executed on
all the remotely stored copies. To deal with such problems, previous multi copy
verification schemes either focused on static files or incurred huge update costs in
a dynamic file scenario. In this paper, we propose some ideas under a Dynamic
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Multi-Replica Provable Data Possession scheme (DMR-PDP) that prevents the
CSP from cheating; for example, by maintaining fewer copies than paid for. DMRPDP also supports efficient dynamic operations like block modification, insertion
and deletion on data replicas over cloud servers.

1.1. INTRODUCTION
When users store data in the cloud, their main concern is whether the
cloud can maintain the data integrity and data can be recovered when there is a
data loss or server failure. Cloud service providers (CSP), in order to save storage
cost, may tend to discard some data or data copies that is not accessed often, or
mitigate data to second-level storage devices. CSPs may also conceal data loss
due to management faults, hardware failures or attacks. Therefore, a critical issue
in storing data at untrusted CSPs is periodically verifying whether the storage
servers maintain data integrity; store data completely and correctly as stated in
the service level agreement (SLA).
Data replication is a commonly used technique to increase the data availability in cloud computing. Cloud replicates the data and stores them strategically
on multiple servers located at various geographic locations. Since the replicated
copies look exactly similar, it is difficult to verify whether the cloud really stores
multiple copies of the data. Cloud can easily cheat the owner by storing only one
copy of the data. Thus, the owner would like to verify at regular intervals whether
the cloud indeed possesses multiple copies of the data as claimed in the SLA. In
general, cloud has the capability to generate multiple replicas when a data owner
challenges the CSP to prove that it possesses multiple copies of the data. Also,
it is a valid assumption that the owner of the data may not have a copy of the
data stored locally. So, the major task of the owner is not only to verify that
the data is intact but also to recover the data if any deletions/corruptions of data
are identified. If the data owner during his verification using DMR-PDP scheme
detects some data loss in any of the replicas in the cloud, he can recover the data
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from other replicas that are stored intact. Since, the replicas are to be stored at
diverse geographic locations, it is safe to assume that a data loss will not occur at
all the replicas at the same time.
Provable data possession (PDP) [2] is a technique to audit and validate
the integrity of data stored on remote servers. In a typical PDP model, the
data owner generates metadata/tag for a data file to be used later for integrity
verification. To ensure security, the data owner encrypts the file and generates
tags on the encrypted file. The data owner sends the encrypted file and the tags
to the cloud, and deletes the local copy of the file. When the data owner wishes
to verify the data integrity, he generates a challenge vector and sends it to the
cloud. The cloud replies by computing a response on the data and sends it to the
verifier/data owner to prove that multiple copies of the data file are stored in the
cloud. Different variations of PDP schemes such as [2], [4], [6], [7], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [15] were proposed under different cryptographic assumptions. But most of
these schemes deal only with static data files and are valid only for verifying a
single copy. A few other schemes such as [3], [5], [8], [13], [14] provide dynamic
scalability of a single copy of a data file for various applications which mean that
the remotely stored data can not only be accessed by the authorized users, but
also be updated and scaled by the data owner.
In this paper, we propose a scheme that allows the data owner to securely
ensure that the CSP stores multiple replicas. A simple way to make the replicas
look unique and differentiable is using probabilistic encryption schemes. Probabilistic encryption creates different cipher texts each time the same message is
encrypted using the same key. Thus, our scheme uses homomorphic probabilistic
encryption to create distinct replicas/copies of the data file and BLS signatures
[17] to create constant amount of metadata for any number of replicas. Probabilistic encryption encrypts all the replicas with the same key. Therefore, in our
scheme the data owner will have to share just one decryption key with the authorized users and need not worry about CSP granting access to any of the replicas to
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the authorized users. The homomorphic property of the encryption scheme helps
in efficient file updates. The data owner has to encrypt the difference between the
updated file and the old file and send it to the cloud, which updates all the replicas
by performing homomorphic addition on the file copies. Any authenticated data
structure, e.g, Merklee Hash Trees and Skiplist can be used with our scheme to
ensure that the cloud uses the right file blocks for data integrity verification. However, the ways to efficiently manage authenticated data structures in the cloud is
not within the scope of our paper.
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Overview of
the related work is provided in Section 2 followed by the problem definition in
Section 3, and a detailed description of our scheme in Section 4. Future work is
discussed in Section 5.

1.2. RELATED WORK
Ateniese et al. [2] were the first to define the Provable Data Possession
(PDP) model for ensuring the possession of files on untrusted storages. They
made use of RSA-based homomorphic tags for auditing outsourced data. However, dynamic data storage and multiple replica system are not considered in this
scheme. In their subsequent work [12], they proposed a dynamic version which
supports very basic block operations with limited functionality, and does not support block insertions. In [13], Wang et al. considered dynamic data storage in a
distributed scenario, and proposed a challenge-response protocol which can determine data correctness as well as locate possible errors. Similar to [12], only partial
support for dynamic data operation is considered. Erway et al. [14] extended the
PDP model in [2] to support provable updates to stored data files using rank-based
authenticated skip lists. However, efficiency of their scheme remains unclear and
these schemes hold good only for verifying a single copy.
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Curtmola et.al [1] proposed Multiple-Replica PDP (MR-PDP) scheme wherein
the data owner can verify that several copies of a file are stored by a storage service provider. In their scheme, distinct replicas are created by first encrypting
the data and then masking it with randomness generated from a Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF). The randomized data is then stored across multiple servers. The
scheme uses RSA signatures for creation of tags. But, their scheme did not address how the authorized users of the data can access the file copies from the cloud
servers noting that the internal operations of the CSP are opaque and do not support dynamic data operations. Ayad F. Barsoum et al. [16] proposed creation of
distinct copies by appending replica number to the file blocks and encrypting it
using an encryption scheme that has strong diffusion property, e.g., AES. Their
scheme supports dynamic data operations but during file updates, the copies in
all the servers should be encrypted again and updated on the cloud. This scheme
suits perfectly for static multiple replicas but proves costly in a dynamic scenario.
BLS signatures are used for creating tags and authenticated data structures like
Merklee Hash Trees are used to ensure right file blocks are used during verification. Authorized users of the data should know random numbers in [1] and replica
number in [16] to generate the original file.

1.3. DYNAMIC MULTI-REPLICA PROVABLE DATA POSSESSION
(DMR-PDP) SCHEME
The cloud computing model considered in this work consists of three main
components as illustrated in Figure 1: (i) a data owner that can be an individual
or an organization originally possessing sensitive data to be stored in the cloud;
(ii) a CSP who manages cloud servers and provides paid storage space on its
infrastructure to store the owner’s files and (iii) authorized users - a set of owner’s
clients who have the right to access the remote data and share some keys with the
data owner.
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Figure 1.1. Cloud Computing Data Storage Model.

1.3.1. Problem Definition and Design Goals. More recently, many
data owners relieve their burden of local data storage and maintenance by outsourcing their data to a CSP. CSP undertakes the data replication task in order
to increase the data availability, durability and reliability but the customers have
to pay for using the CSPs storage infrastructure. On the other hand, cloud customers should be convinced that the (1) CSP actually possesses all the data copies
as agreed upon, (2) integrity of these data copies are maintained, and (3) the customers are receiving the service that they are paying for. Therefore, in this paper,
we address the problem of securely and efficiently creating multiple replicas of
the data file of the owner to be stored over untrusted CSP and then auditing all
these copies to verify their completeness and correctness. Our design goals are
summarized below:
1. Dynamic Multi-Replica Provable Data Possession (DMR-PDP) protocols
should efficiently and securely provide the owner with strong evidence that
the CSP is in possession of all the data copies as agreed upon and that these
copies are intact.
2. Allowing the users authorized by the data owner to seamlessly access a file
copy from the CSP.
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3. Using only a single set of metadata/tags for all the file replicas for verification
purposes.
4. Allowing dynamic data operation support to enable the data owner to perform block-level operations on the data files while maintaining the same level
of data correctness assurance.
5. Enabling both probabilistic and deterministic verification guarantees.
1.3.2. Preliminaries and Notations. In this section, we provide details
of the Bilinear mapping and Paillier Encryption schemes used in our present work.
1. Assume that F, a data file to be outsourced, is composed of a sequence of m
blocks, i.e., F = {b1 , b2 ,..,bm }.
2. Fi = {bi1 , bi2 ,....,bim } represents the file copy i.
3. Bilinear Map/Pairing: Let G1 , G2 , and GT be cyclic groups of prime order
a. Let u and v be generators of G1 and G2 , respectively. A bilinear pairing
is a map e : G1 x G2 → GT with the following properties:
• Bilinear: e(u1 u2 , v1 ) = e(u1 , v1 ) . e(u2 , v1 ), e(u1 , v1 v2 ) = e(u1 , v1 ) .
e(u1 ,v2 ) ∀ u1 , u2 ∈ G1 and v1 , v2 ∈ G2
• Non-degenerate: e(u, v ) 6= 1
• There exists an efficient algorithm for computing e
• e(u1 x , v1 y ) = e(u1 , v1 )xy ∀ u1 ∈ G1 ; v1 ∈ G2 , and x, y ∈ Za
4. H(.) is a map-to-point hash function: {0, 1}∗ → G1 .
5. Homomorphic Encryption: A homomorphic encryption scheme has the following properties.
• E(m1 + m2 ) = E(m1 ) +h E(m2 ) where +h is a homomorphic addition
operation.
• E(k*m) = E(m)k .
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where E(.) represents a homomorphic encryption scheme and m, m1 , m2 are
messages that are encrypted and k is some random number.
6. Paillier Encryption: Paillier cryptosystem is a homomorphic probabilistic
encryption scheme. The steps are as follows.
• Compute N = p * q and λ = LCM (p-1, q-1), where p, q are two prime
numbers.
• Select a random number g such that its order is a multiple of N and g
∈ ZN 2∗ .
• Public key is (N, g) and secret key is λ, where N = p*q.
• Cipher text for a message m is computed as c = gm rN mod N2 where
r is a random number and r ∈ ZN ∗ , c ∈ ZN 2∗ and m ∈ ZN .
• Plain text is obtained by m = L(cλ mod N2 ) * (L(gλ mod N2 ))−1 mod
N.
7. Properties of public key g in Paillier Scheme
• g ∈ ZN 2∗ .
• If g = (1 + N) mod N2 , it has few interesting properties
(a) Order of the value (1 + N) is N.
(b) (1 + N)m ≡ (1 + mN) mod N2 . (1 + mN) can be used directly
instead of calculating (1 + N)m . This avoids the costly exponential
operation during data encryption.
1.3.3. DMR-PDP Construction. In our approach, the data owner creates multiple encrypted replicas and uploads them on to the cloud. The CSP stores
them on one or multiple servers located at various geographic locations. The data
owner shares the decryption key with a set of authorized users. In order to access
the data, an authorized user sends a data request to the CSP and receives a data
copy in an encrypted form that can be decrypted using a secret key shared with
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Figure 1.2. DMR-PDP Scheme
the owner. The proposed scheme consists of seven algorithms: KeyGen, ReplicaGen, TagGen, Prove, Verify, PrepareUpdate and ExecUpdate. The overview of
the communication involved in our scheme is shown in Figure 2.
1. (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(). This algorithm is run by the data owner to generate
a public key pk and a private key sk. The data owner generates three sets
of keys.
(a) Keys for data tags : This key is used for generating tags for the data.
The data owner selects a bilinear map e and selects a private key l ∈
Za . Public key is calculated as y = vl ∈ G2 .
(b) Keys for data : This key is used for encrypting the data and thereby
creating multiple data copies. The data owner selects paillier public
keys (N, g) with g = (1 + N) mod N2 and secret key λ.
(c) PRF key : The data owner generates a PRF key KeyP RF which generates s numbers. These s numbers are used in creating s copies of
the data. Each number is used in creating one data copy. Let {k1 ,
k2 ,..,ks } ∈ ZN ∗ be the numbers generated by the PRF key. KeyP RF is
maintained confidentially by the data owner and hence the s numbers
used in creating multiple copies are not known to the cloud.
2. {Fi }1≤i≤s ← ReplicaGen (s, F). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It
takes the number of replicas s and the file F as input and generates s unique
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differentiable copies {Fi }1≤i≤s . This algorithm is run only once. Unique
copies of each file block of file F is created by encrypting it using a probabilistic encryption scheme, e.g., Paillier encryption scheme. Through probabilistic encryption, encrypting a file block s times yields s distinct cipher
texts. For a file F = {b1 , b2 ,..,bm } multiple data copies are generated using Paillier encryption scheme as Fi = {(1+N)b1 (ki ri1 )N , (1+N)b2 (ki ri2 )N ,..,
(1+N)bm (ki rim )N }1≤i≤m . Using Paillier’s properties the above result can be
rewritten as Fi = {(1+b1 N)(ki ri1 )N , (1+b2 N)(ki ri2 )N ,.., (1+bm N)(ki rim )N }1≤i≤m ,
where i represents the file copy number, ki represents the numbers generated from PRF key KeyP RF and rij represents any random number used in
Paillier encryption scheme. ki is multiplied by a random number rij and the
product is used for encryption. The presence of ki in a file block identifies
which file copy the file block belongs to. All these file copies yield the original file when decrypted . This allows the users authorized by the data owner
to seamlessly access the file copy received from the CSP.
3. φ ← TagGen (sk, F). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes the
private key sk and the file F as input and outputs the tags φ. We use BLS
signature scheme to create tags on the data. BLS signatures are short and
homomorphic in nature and allow concurrent data verification, which means
multiple data blocks can be verified at the same time. In our scheme, tags
are generated on each file block bi as φi = (H(F) . ubi N )l ∈ G1 where u ∈
G1 and H(.) ∈ G1 represents hash value which uniquely represents the file
F. The data owner sends the tag set φ = {φi }1≤i≤m to the cloud.
4. P ← Prove (F, φ, challenge). This algorithm is run by the CSP. It takes the
file replicas of file F, the tags φ and challenge vector sent by the data owner
as input and returns a proof P which guarantees that the CSP is actually
storing s copies of the file F and all these copies are intact. The data owner
uses the proof P to verify the data integrity. There are two phases in this
algorithm:
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(a) Challenge: In this phase the data owner challenges the cloud to verify
the integrity of all outsourced copies. There are two types of verification
schemes:
i. Deterministic - here all the file blocks from all the copies are used
for verification.
ii. Probabilistic - only a few blocks from all the copies are used for
verification. A Pseudo Random Function key (PRF) is used to
generate random indices ranging between 1 and m. The file blocks
from these indices are used for verification. In each verification a
percentage of the file is verified and it accounts for the verification
of the entire file.
At each challenge, the data owner chooses the type of verification
scheme he wishes to use. If the owner chooses the deterministic verification scheme, he generates one PRF key, Key1 . If he chooses the
probabilistic scheme he generates two PRF keys, Key1 and Key2 . PRF
keyed with Key1 generates c (1 ≤ c ≤ m) random file indices which indicates the file blocks that CSP should use for verification. PRF keyed
with Key2 generates s random values and the CSP should use each of
these random numbers for each file copy while computing the response.
The data owner sends the generated keys to the CSP.
(b) Response: This phase is executed by the CSP when a challenge for
data integrity verification is received from the data owner. Here, we
show the proof for probabilistic verification scheme (the deterministic
verification scheme also follows the same procedure). The CSP receives
two PRF keys, Key1 and Key2 from the data owner. Using Key1 , CSP
generates a set {C} with c (1≤ c ≤ m) random file indices ({C} ∈
{1, 2,..,m}), which indicate the file blocks that CSP should use for
verification. Using Key2 , CSP generates ’s’ random values T = {t1 ,
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t2 ,..,ts }. The cloud performs two operations. One on the tags and the
other on the file blocks.
i. Operation on the tags: Cloud multiplies the file tags corresponding
to the file indices generated by PRF key Key1 .
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(H(F ).ubj N )l
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ii. Operation on the file blocks: The cloud first takes each file copy
and multiplies all the file blocks corresponding to the file indices
generated by PRF key Key1 . The product of each copy is raised to
the power the random number generated for that copy by the PRF
key Key2 . The result of the above operation for each file copy i is
Q
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Using properties of Paillier scheme, the above equation can be
rewritten as

µ = (1 + N
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The CSP sends σ and µ mod N2 values to the data owner.
5. {1, 0} ← Verify (pk, P). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as
input the public key pk and the proof P returned from the CSP, and outputs
1 if the integrity of all file copies is correctly verified or 0 otherwise. After
receiving σ and µ values from the CSP, the data owner does the following:
(a) calculates v = (

s
Q

(ki )ti cN ) and d = Decrypt(µ)/(

i=1

s
P

ki ). This can be

i=1

calculated from the values generated from KeyP RF and c.
(b) checks if µ mod v ≡ 0. This ensures that the cloud has used all the file
copies while computing the response.
(c) checks if (H(F)c udN )l = σ. This ensures that the CSP has used all
the file blocks while computing the response. If options b and c are
satisfied, it indicates that the data stored by the owner in the cloud is
intact and the cloud has stored multiple copies of the data as agreed in
the service level agreement.
6. Update ← PrepareUpdate (). This algorithm is run by the data owner to
perform any operation on the outsourced file copies stored by the remote
CSP. The output of this algorithm is an Update request. The data owner
sends the Update request to the cloud and will be of the form <IdF , BlockOp,
j, bi ’, φ’>, where IdF is the file identifier, BlockOp corresponds to block
operation, j denotes the index of the file block, bi ’ represents the updated
file blocks and φ’ is the updated tag. BlockOp can be data modification,
insertion or delete operation.
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Owner
1. Calculates ∆bj = bj ’ - bj .
2. Encrypts ∆bj using Paillier encryption.
E(∆bj ) = (1 + ∆bj N) rN , where r is some random number.
0
3. Calculates the new file tag for bj ’, φ’ = (H(F) ubj N )l .
4. Generates PRF keys Key1 , Key2 to verify the correctness
of modify operation.
<IdF , modify, j, E(∆bj ), φ’> , Key1 , Key2

CSP

-

5. Performs homomorphic addition operation
E(bj ’) = E(∆bj ) * E(bj ) on all the file copies.
6. Deletes the old tag and replaces it with the new tag φ’.
7. Calculates a response µ, σ.
µ, σ


8. Calculates v and d
9. Verifies if µ mod v ≡ 0 and checks if (H(F)c udN )l = σ.
Figure 1.3. Block modification operation in the DMR-PDP scheme
7. (F’, φ’) ← ExecUpdate (F, φ, Update). This algorithm is run by the CSP
where the input parameters are the file copies F, the tags φ, and Update
request (sent from the owner). It outputs an updated version of all the file
copies F’ along with updated signatures φ’. After any block operation, the
data owner runs the challenge protocol to ensure that the cloud has executed
the operations correctly. The operation in Update request can be modifying
a file block, inserting a new file block or deleting a file block.
(a) Modification: Data modification is one of the most frequently used
dynamic operations. The data modification operation in DMR-PDP
scheme is shown in Figure 3.
(b) Insertion: In the block insertion operation, the owner inserts a new
block after position j in a file. If the file F had m blocks initially,
the file will have m+1 blocks after the insert operation. The file block
insertion operation is shown in Figure 4.
(c) Deletion: Block deletion operation is the opposite of the insertion
operation. When one block is deleted, indices of all subsequent blocks
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are moved one step forward. To delete a specific data block at position
j from all copies, the owner sends a delete request <IdF , delete, j, null,
null> to the cloud. Upon receiving the request, the cloud deletes the
tag and the file block at index j in all the file copies.
Owner
CSP
1. Encrypts the new file block s times
2. Creates tag φ for the new file block
3. Generates PRF keys Key1 , Key2 to verify the correctness
of insert operation.
<IdF , insert, j, s file blocks, φ> , Key1 , Key2
-

4. Inserts the new file block at location j
5. Stores the new tag φ.
6. Calculates a response µ, σ.
µ, σ


7. Calculates v and d
8. Verifies if µ mod v ≡ 0 and checks if (H(F)c udN )l = σ.
Figure 1.4. Block insertion operation in the DMR-PDP scheme

1.4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have discussed work related to the replicated data integrity preservation in a cloud environment and presented a Dynamic MultiReplica Provable Data Possession scheme (DMR-PDP) to periodically verify the
correctness and completeness of multiple data copies stored in the cloud. Our
scheme also supports dynamic data update operations. All the data copies can
be decrypted using a single decryption key, thus providing a seamless access to
the data’s authorized users. This scheme can be extended for multiple versions
where only deltas can be stored in the cloud and owner can save on storage cost.
Currently, we are implementing the proposed scheme for evaluating it in a real
cloud platform using different performance metrics and comparing it with some of
the existing methods. We also plan to extend this scheme for secure multi-version
data where only one original and multiple deltas can be stored in the cloud.
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ABSTRACT
The cloud computing is an emerging model in which computing infrastructure resources are provided as a service over the Internet. Data owners can
outsource their data by remotely storing them in the cloud and enjoy on-demand
high quality services from a shared pool of configurable computing resources. However, since data owners and the cloud servers are not in the same trusted domain,
the outsourced data may be at risk as the cloud server may no longer be fully
trusted. Therefore, data integrity is of critical importance in such a scenario.
Cloud should let the owners or a trusted third party to check for the integrity
of their data storage without demanding a local copy of the data. Owners often
replicate their data on the cloud servers across multiple data centers to provide
a higher level of scalability, availability, and durability. When the data owners
ask the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to replicate data, they are charged a higher
storage fee by the CSP. Therefore, the data owners need to be strongly convinced
that the CSP is storing data copies agreed on in the service level contract, and
data-updates have been correctly executed on all the remotely stored copies. To
deal with such problems, previous multi copy verification schemes either focused
on static files or incurred huge update costs in a dynamic file scenario. In this

27

paper, we propose a Dynamic Multi-Replica Provable Data Possession scheme
(DMR-PDP) that prevents the CSP from cheating; for example, by maintaining
fewer copies than paid for and/or tampering data. In addition, we also extend the
scheme to support a basic file versioning system where only the difference between
the original file and the updated file is propagated rather than the propagation
of operations for privacy reasons. DMR-PDP also supports efficient dynamic operations like block modification, insertion and deletion on replicas over the cloud
servers. Through security analysis and experimental results, we demonstrate that
the proposed scheme is secure and performs better than some other related ideas
published recently.

2.1. INTRODUCTION
When users store data in the cloud, their main concern is whether the cloud
can maintain data integrity and whether the data can be recovered when there is
data loss or server failure. Cloud Service Providers (CSP), in order to save storage
cost, may tend to discard some data or data copies that are not accessed often,
or mitigate such data to the second-level storage devices. CSPs may also conceal
data loss due to management faults, hardware failures or attacks. Therefore, a
critical issue in storing data at untrusted CSPs is periodically verifying whether
the storage servers maintain data integrity and store data completely and correctly
as stated in the Service Level Agreement (SLA).
Replication is a commonly used technique to increase the data availability
in the cloud computing. Cloud replicates the data and stores them strategically
on multiple servers located at various geographic locations. Since the replicated
data are copies, it is difficult to verify whether the cloud really stores multiple
copies of the data. The cloud can easily cheat the owner by storing only one copy
of the data. Thus, the owner would like to verify at regular intervals whether
the cloud indeed possesses multiple copies of the data as claimed in the SLA. In
general, the cloud has the capability to generate multiple replicas when a data
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owner challenges the CSP to prove that it possesses multiple copies of the data.
Also, it is a valid assumption that the owner of the data may not have a copy
of the data stored locally. So, the major task of the owner is not only to verify
that the data is intact but also to recover the data if any deletions/corruptions of
data are identified. If the owner, during his verification using DMR-PDP scheme,
detects some data loss in any of the replicas in the cloud, he can recover the data
from other replicas that are stored intact. Since, the replicas are to be stored at
diverse geographic locations, it is assumed to be safe that the data loss will not
occur at all the replicas at the same time.
Provable data possession (PDP) [2] is a technique to audit and validate
the integrity of data stored on remote servers. In a typical PDP model, the
data owner generates metadata/tag for a data file to be used later for integrity
verification. To ensure security, the data owner encrypts the file and generates
tags on the encrypted file. The data owner sends the encrypted file and the
tags to the cloud, and deletes the local copy of the file. When the data owner
wishes to verify data integrity, he generates a challenge vector and sends it to the
cloud. The cloud replies by computing a response on the data and sends it to the
verifier/data owner to prove that multiple copies of the data file are stored in the
cloud. Different variations of PDP schemes such as [2], [4], [6], [7], [9], [10], [11],
[12], [15] were proposed under different cryptographic assumptions. However, most
of these schemes deal only with static data files and are valid only for verifying a
single copy. A few other schemes such as [3], [5], [8], [13], [14] provide dynamic
scalability of a single copy of a data file for various applications which means that
the remotely stored data can not only be accessed by the authorized users, but
also be updated and scaled by the data owner.
In this paper, we propose a scheme that allows the data owner to securely
ensure that the CSP stores multiple replicas. A simple way to make the replicas
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look unique and differentiable is by using probabilistic encryption schemes. Probabilistic encryption creates different cipher texts each time the same message is encrypted using the same key. Thus, our scheme uses homomorphic probabilistic encryption to create distinct replicas/copies of the data file and BonehLynnShacham
signature scheme (BLS) signatures [17] to create constant amount of metadata for
any number of replicas. Probabilistic encryption encrypts all the replicas with the
same key. Therefore, in our scheme the data owner will have to share just one
decryption key with the authorized users and need not worry about CSP granting
access to any of the replicas to the authorized users. The homomorphic property
of the encryption scheme helps in efficient file updates. The data owner has to
encrypt the difference between the updated file and the old file and send it to
the cloud, which updates all the replicas by performing homomorphic addition
on the file copies. Any authenticated data structure such as Merkle Hash Trees
or Skiplist can be used with our scheme to ensure that the cloud uses the right
file blocks for data integrity verification. However, the ways to efficiently manage
authenticated data structures in the cloud is not within the scope of this paper.
RSA signatures used in [1] can also be used with DMR-PDP scheme for creating
data tags. We compare the performance of BLS and RSA signatures and discuss
the benefits of using BLS signatures over RSA singatures. We identify the possible
attacks the CSP can use to cheat the data owner and provide a security analysis of the proposed protocol against these attacks. Efficiency of the protocol has
been experimentally tested and the results demonstrate that our protocol is more
efficient than the scheme in [16].
We also extended the DMR-PDP scheme to support a basic file versioning
system. The advantage of a file version system is that the data owner can review
the changes done to the file and also retrieve the older versions of the file. The
cloud computing solutions like Dropbox, Google Drive provide basic file version
control system in addition to data storage service. The client-server file versioning
models like SVN offer much more features when compared to what these cloud
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solutions provide. All these solutions use Delta compression technique where only
the difference between the original file and the updated file is propagated and
stored on the server. The differences are recorded in discrete files called ”deltas”
or ”diffs”. To retrieve any particular version of the file, the change or delta stored
on the server is merged with the base version. This reduces the bandwidth and
storage space on the server. In our present setting, the data owner uses a homomorphic probabilistic encryption scheme to encrypt and generates multiple encrypted
replicas of the file. The cloud stores the replicas across multiple servers. The challenge is to store multiple replicas of the file and maintain the file updates as deltas
to support a basic file versioning system when the files are encrypted. To address
this, we propose Multiple Replica File Version Control System (MRFVCS) as an
extension to the DMR-PDP scheme, which supports encrypted file version control when the data is replicated and the data owner can still use the DMR-PDP
scheme to verify the integrity of the data. We implemented the MRFVCS scheme
and our experiments show that it is efficient maintaining versions and needs only
a little data storage on the data owner side .
Organization: The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Overview of the
related work is provided in Section 2 followed by the a detailed description of our
scheme in Section 3, and Security analysis in Section 4. MRFVCS is discussed in
section 5 followed by Experimental results in Section 6 and Conclusion in Section
7.

2.2. RELATED WORK
Ateniese et al. [2] were the first to define the Provable Data Possession
(PDP) model for ensuring the possession of files on untrusted storages. They
made use of RSA-based homomorphic tags for auditing outsourced data. However, dynamic data storage and multiple replica system are not considered in this
scheme. In their subsequent work [3] and [12], they proposed a dynamic version
which supports very basic block operations with limited functionality, and does
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not support block insertions. In [13], Wang et al. considered dynamic data storage in a distributed scenario, and proposed a challenge-response protocol which
can determine data correctness as well as locate possible errors. Similar to [12],
only partial support for dynamic data operation is considered. Erway et al. [5]
extended the PDP model in [2] to support dynamic updates to stored data files
using rank-based authenticated skip lists. However, the efficiency of their scheme
remains unclear and these schemes hold good only for verifying a single copy.
Wang et al. [14] use Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) for data integrity verification and
their scheme supports dynamic data operations, but in their scheme data is not
encrypted and works only for a single copy. Hao et al. [8] proposed a scheme that
supports both the dynamic data operations and public verifiability. Public verifiability allows anyone, not necessarily the data owner, to verify the integrity of data
stored in the cloud by running the challenge-response protocol. Their scheme too
do not consider data encryption and their scheme cannot be extended to suit the
scenario where multiple data copies are stored.
Curtmola et.al [1] proposed Multiple-Replica PDP (MR-PDP) scheme wherein
the data owner can verify that several copies of a file are stored by a storage service provider. In their scheme, distinct replicas are created by first encrypting the
data and then masking it with the randomness generated from a Pseudo-Random
Function (PRF). The randomized data is then stored across multiple servers. The
scheme uses RSA signatures for creation of tags. But, their scheme did not address how the authorized users of the data can access the file copies from the cloud
servers noting that the internal operations of the CSP are opaque and do not support dynamic data operations. Ayad F. Barsoum et al. [16] proposed creation of
distinct copies by appending replica number to the file blocks and encrypting it
using an encryption scheme that has strong diffusion property, e.g., AES. Their
scheme supports dynamic data operations but during file updates, the copies in
all the servers should be encrypted again and updated on the cloud. This scheme
suits perfectly for static multiple replicas but proves costly in a dynamic scenario.
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BLS signatures are used for creating tags and authenticated data structures like
Merkle Hash Trees are used to ensure that the right file blocks are used during
verification. Authorized users of the data should know random numbers in [1] and
replica number in [16] to generate the original file.

2.3. DYNAMIC MULTI-REPLICA PROVABLE DATA POSSESSION
(DMR-PDP) SCHEME
The cloud computing model considered in this work consists of three main
components as illustrated in Figure 1: (i) a data owner that can be an individual
or an organization originally possessing sensitive data to be stored in the cloud;
(ii) a CSP who manages the cloud servers and provides paid storage space on its
infrastructure to store the owner’s files and (iii) authorized users - a set of owner’s
clients who have the right to access the remote data and share some keys with the
data owner.

Figure 2.1. Cloud Computing Data Storage Model.

2.3.1. Problem Definition and Design Goals. More recently, many
data owners relieve their burden of local data storage and maintenance by outsourcing their data to a CSP. CSP undertakes the data replication task in order
to increase the data availability, durability and reliability but the customers have
to pay for using the CSPs storage infrastructure. On the other hand, the cloud
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customers should be convinced that the (1) CSP actually possesses all the data
copies as agreed upon, (2) integrity of these data copies are maintained, and (3)
the owners are able to update the data that they are paying for. Therefore, in
this paper, we address the problem of securely and efficiently creating multiple
replicas of the data file of the owner to be stored over untrusted CSP and then
auditing all these copies to verify their completeness and correctness. Our design
goals are summarized below:
1. Dynamic Multi-Replica Provable Data Possession (DMR-PDP) protocols
should efficiently and securely provide the owner with strong evidence that
the CSP is in possession of all the data copies as agreed upon and that these
copies are intact.
2. Allowing the users authorized by the data owner to seamlessly access a file
copy from the CSP.
3. Using only a single set of metadata/tags for all the file replicas for verification
purposes.
4. Allowing dynamic data operation support to enable the data owner to perform block-level operations on the data files while maintaining the same level
of data correctness assurance.
5. Enabling both probabilistic and deterministic verification guarantees.
2.3.2. Preliminaries and Notations. In this section, we provide details
of the Bilinear mapping and Paillier Encryption schemes used in our present work.
1. Assume that F, a data file to be outsourced, is composed of a sequence of
m blocks, i.e., F = {b1 , b2 ,..,bm } where bi ∈ ZN , where ZN is the set of all
residues when divided by N and N is a public key in Paillier scheme.
2. Let Fi represent the file copy i. So Fi = {bi1 , bi2 ,....,bim }, where bij represents file block bj of file copy i.
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3. BLS Signatures: BLS signatures are short homomorphic signatures that use
the properties of bilinear pairings on certain elliptic curves. These signatures
allow concurrent data verification, where multiple blocks can be verified at
the same time.
4. Bilinear Map/Pairing: Let G1 , G2 , and GT be cyclic groups of prime order
a. Let u and v be generators of G1 and G2 , respectively. A bilinear pairing
is a map e : G1 x G2 → GT with the following properties:
• Bilinear: e(u1 u2 , v1 ) = e(u1 , v1 ) . e(u2 , v1 ), e(u1 , v1 v2 ) = e(u1 , v1 ) .
e(u1 ,v2 ) ∀ u1 , u2 ∈ G1 and v1 , v2 ∈ G2
• Non-degenerate: e(u, v ) 6= 1
• There exists an efficient algorithm for computing e
• e(u1 x , v1 y ) = e(u1 , v1 )xy ∀ u1 ∈ G1 ; v1 ∈ G2 , and x, y ∈ Za
5. H(.) is a map-to-point hash function: {0, 1}∗ → G1 .
6. Homomorphic Encryption: A homomorphic encryption scheme has the following properties.
• E(m1 + m2 ) = E(m1 ) +h E(m2 ) where +h is a homomorphic addition
operation.
• E(k*m) = E(m)k .
where E(.) represents a homomorphic encryption scheme and m, m1 , m2 are
messages that are encrypted and k is some random number.
7. Paillier Encryption: Paillier cryptosystem is a homomorphic probabilistic
encryption scheme. The steps are as follows.
• Compute N = p * q and λ = LCM (p-1, q-1), where p, q are two prime
numbers.
• Select a random number g such that its order is a multiple of N and g
∈ ZN 2∗ .
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• Public key is (N, g) and secret key is λ, where N = p*q.
• Cipher text for a message m is computed as c = gm rN mod N2 where
r is a random number and r ∈ ZN ∗ , c ∈ ZN 2∗ and m ∈ ZN .
• Plain text is obtained by m = L(cλ mod N2 ) * (L(gλ mod N2 ))−1 mod
N.
8. Properties of public key g in Paillier Scheme
• g ∈ ZN 2∗ .
• If g = (1 + N) mod N2 , it has few interesting properties
(a) Order of the value (1 + N) is N.
(b) (1 + N)m ≡ (1 + mN) mod N2 . (1 + mN) can be used directly
instead of calculating (1 + N)m . This avoids the costly exponential
operation during data encryption.
2.3.3. DMR-PDP Construction. In our approach, the data owner creates multiple encrypted replicas and uploads them on to the cloud. The CSP stores
them on one or multiple servers located at various geographic locations. The data
owner shares the decryption key with a set of authorized users. In order to access
the data, an authorized user sends a data request to the CSP and receives a data
copy in an encrypted form that can be decrypted using a secret key shared with
the owner. The proposed scheme consists of seven algorithms: KeyGen, ReplicaGen, TagGen, Prove, Verify, PrepareUpdate and ExecUpdate. The overview of
the communication involved in our scheme is shown in Figure 2.
1. (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(). This algorithm is run by the data owner to generate
a public key pk and a private key sk. The data owner generates five sets of
keys.
(a) Key for data tags : This key is used for generating tags for the data.
The data owner selects a bilinear map e and selects a private key l ∈
Za , where l is the private key and a is the order of cyclic groups G1 ,
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Figure 2.2. DMR-PDP Scheme
G2 , and GT . Public key is calculated as y = vl ∈ G2 , where v is the
generator of group G2 .
(b) Key for data : This key is used for encrypting the data and thereby
creating multiple data copies. The data owner selects paillier public
keys (N, g) with g = (1 + N) mod N2 and secret key λ.
(c) PRF key for verification: The data owner generates a PRF key KeyP RF
which generates s numbers. These s numbers are used in creating s
copies of the data. Each number is used in creating one data copy.
Let {k1 , k2 ,..,ks } ∈ ZN ∗ be the numbers generated by the PRF key.
KeyP RF is maintained confidentially by the data owner and hence the
s numbers used in creating multiple copies are not known to the cloud.
(d) PRF key for Paillier encryption: The data owner generates a PRF
key Keyrand , which is used for generating the random numbers used in
Paillier encryption.
(e) PRF key for Tag generation: The data owner generates a PRF key
Keytag , which is used in generation of tags.
2. {Fi }1≤i≤s ← ReplicaGen (s, F). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It
takes the number of replicas s and the file F as input and generates s unique
differentiable copies {Fi }1≤i≤s . This algorithm is run by the data owner only
once. Unique copies of each file block of file F is created by encrypting it
using a probabilistic encryption scheme, e.g., Paillier encryption scheme.
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Through probabilistic encryption, encrypting a file block s times yields s
distinct cipher texts. For a file F = {b1 , b2 ,..,bm } multiple data copies
are generated using Paillier encryption scheme as Fi = {(1+N)b1 (ki ri1 )N ,
(1+N)b2 (ki ri2 )N ,.., (1+N)bm (ki rim )N }1≤i≤m . Using Paillier’s properties the
above result can be rewritten as Fi = {(1+b1 N)(ki ri1 )N , (1+b2 N)(ki ri2 )N ,..,
(1+bm N)(ki rim )N }1≤i≤m , where i represents the file copy number, ki represents the numbers generated from PRF key KeyP RF and rij represents
random number used in Paillier encryption scheme generated from PRF key
Keyrand . ki is multiplied by the random number rij and the product is used
for encryption. The presence of ki in a block identifies which copy the file
block belongs to. All these file copies yield the original file when decrypted.
This allows the users authorized by the data owner to seamlessly access the
file copy received from the CSP.
3. φ ← TagGen (sk, F). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes the
private key sk and the file F as input, and outputs the tags φ. We use BLS
signature scheme to create tags on the data. BLS signatures are short and
homomorphic in nature and allow concurrent data verification, which means
multiple data blocks can be verified at the same time. In our scheme, tags
are generated on each file block bi as φi = (H(F) . ubi N +ai )l ∈ G1 where u
∈ G1 , H(.) ∈ G1 represents hash value which uniquely represents the file
F and {ai }1≤i≤m are numbers generated from PRF key Keytag to randomize
the data in the tag. Randomization is required to avoid generation of same
tags for similar data blocks. The data owner sends the tag set φ = {φi }1≤i≤m
to the cloud.
4. P ← Prove (F, φ, challenge). This algorithm is run by the CSP. It takes
the replicas of file F, the tags φ and challenge vector sent by the data owner
as input and returns a proof P which guarantees that the CSP is actually
storing s copies of the file F and all these copies are intact. The data owner
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uses the proof P to verify the data integrity. There are two phases in this
algorithm:
(a) Challenge: In this phase, the data owner challenges the cloud to verify
the integrity of all outsourced copies. There are two types of verification
schemes:
i. Deterministic - here all the file blocks from all the copies are used
for verification.
ii. Probabilistic - only a few blocks from all the copies are used for
verification. A Pseudo Random Function key (PRF) is used to
generate random indices ranging between 1 and m. The file blocks
from these indices are used for verification. In each verification a
percentage of the file is verified and it accounts for the verification
of the entire file.
At each challenge, the data owner chooses the type of verification
scheme he wishes to use. If the owner chooses the deterministic verification scheme, he generates one PRF key, Key1 . If he chooses the
probabilistic scheme he generates two PRF keys, Key1 and Key2 . PRF
keyed with Key1 generates c (1 ≤ c ≤ m) random file indices which indicates the file blocks that CSP should use for verification. PRF keyed
with Key2 generates s random values and the CSP should use each of
these random numbers for each file copy while computing the response.
The data owner sends the generated keys to the CSP.
(b) Response: This phase is executed by the CSP when a challenge for
data integrity verification is received from the data owner. Here, we
show the proof for probabilistic verification scheme (the deterministic
verification scheme also follows the same procedure). The CSP receives
two PRF keys, Key1 and Key2 from the data owner. Using Key1 , CSP
generates a set {C} with c (1≤ c ≤ m) random file indices ({C} ∈

39

{1, 2,..,m}), which indicate the file blocks that CSP should use for
verification. Using Key2 , CSP generates ’s’ random values T = {t1 ,
t2 ,..,ts }. The cloud performs two operations; One on the tags and the
other on the file blocks.
i. Operation on the tags: Cloud multiplies the file tags corresponding
to the file indices generated by PRF key Key1 .
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Owner
1. Calculates ∆bj = bj ’ - bj .
2. Encrypts ∆bj using Paillier encryption.
E(∆bj ) = (1 + ∆bj N) rN , where r is some random number.
0
3. Calculates the new file tag for bj ’, φ’ = (H(F) ubj N )l .
4. Generates PRF keys Key1 , Key2 to verify the correctness
of modify operation.
<IdF , modify, j, E(∆bj ), φ’> , Key1 , Key2

CSP

-

5. Performs homomorphic addition operation
E(bj ’) = E(∆bj ) * E(bj ) on all the file copies.
6. Deletes the old tag and replaces it with
the new tag φ’.
7. Calculates a response µ, σ.
µ, σ


8. Calculates v and d
9. Verifies if µ * Inverse(
checks if H(F)cl . u
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Figure 2.3. Block modification operation in the DMR-PDP scheme
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The CSP sends σ and µ mod N2 values to the data owner.
5. {1, 0} ← Verify (pk, P). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes as
input the public key pk and the proof P returned from the CSP, and outputs
1 if the integrity of all file copies is correctly verified or 0 otherwise. After
receiving σ and µ values from the CSP, the data owner does the following:
(a) calculates v = (

s
Q
i=1

(ki )ti cN ) and d = Decrypt(µ) * Inverse(

s
P

ti ). This

i=1

can be calculated from the values generated from Keyrand , KeyP RF and
the value c.
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(b) checks if µ * Inverse(
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cloud has used all the file copies while computing the response.
c
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generated from PRF key Keytag . This ensures that the CSP has used
all the file blocks while computing the response. If options b and c are
satisfied, it indicates that the data stored by the owner in the cloud is
intact and the cloud has stored multiple copies of the data as agreed in
the service level agreement.
6. Update ← PrepareUpdate (). This algorithm is run by the data owner to perform any operation on the outsourced file copies stored by the remote CSP.
The output of this algorithm is an Update request. The data owner sends
the Update request to the cloud that will be of the form <IdF , BlockOp,
j, bi ’, φ’>, where IdF is the file identifier, BlockOp corresponds to block
operation, j denotes the index of the file block, bi ’ represents the updated
file blocks and φ’ is the updated tag. BlockOp can be data modification,
insertion or delete operation.
7. (F’, φ’) ← ExecUpdate (F, φ, Update). This algorithm is run by the CSP
where the input parameters are the file copies F, the tags φ, and Update
request (sent from the owner). It outputs an updated version of all the file
copies F’ along with updated signatures φ’. After any block operation, the
data owner runs the challenge protocol to ensure that the cloud has executed
the operations correctly. The operation in Update request can be modifying
a file block, inserting a new file block or deleting a file block.
(a) Modification: Data modification is one of the most frequently used
dynamic operations. The data modification operation in DMR-PDP
scheme is shown in Figure 3.
(b) Insertion: In the block insertion operation, the owner inserts a new
block after position j in a file. If the file F had m blocks initially,
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Owner
CSP
1. Encrypts the new file block s times
2. Creates tag φ for the new file block
3. Generates PRF keys Key1 , Key2 to verify the correctness
of insert operation.
<IdF , insert, j, s file blocks, φ> , Key1 , Key2
-

4. Inserts the new file block at location j
5. Stores the new tag φ.
6. Calculates a response µ, σ.
µ, σ


7. Calculates v and d
8. Verifies if µ* Inverse(
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Figure 2.4. Block insertion operation in the DMR-PDP scheme
the file will have m+1 blocks after the insert operation. The file block
insertion operation is shown in Figure 4.
(c) Deletion: Block deletion operation is opposite of the insertion operation. When one block is deleted, indices of all subsequent blocks are
moved one step forward. To delete a specific data block at position j
from all copies, the owner sends a delete request <IdF , delete, j, null,
null> to the cloud. Upon receiving the request, the cloud deletes the
tag and the file block at index j in all the file copies.
2.3.4. Using RSA Signatures. DMR-PDP scheme works well even if
RSA signatures are used instead of BLS singatures. The complete DMR-PDP
scheme using RSA signatures is shown in Figure 5.

2.4. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a formal analysis of the security of our proposed
scheme. The data owner encrypts the files and stores them on the cloud which is
untrusted and so we identify the cloud as the main adversary in this scheme. The
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Preliminaries
Data owner selects two prime numbers p, q
N = pq is the RSA modulus
g is the generator of QRN (QRN is the set of quadratic residues modulo N)
Publick key is (N, g) and secret key is (p, q)
Data owner encrypts the file blocks s times
Data owner generates tags Ti for each file block bi , where Ti = gbi mod N
The data file and the data tags are sent to the cloud.
Owner
CSP
1. Generates PRF keys Key1 , Key2 and sends them
to the cloud to verify data integrity
IdF , Key1 , Key2
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
6.

-

2. Calculates µ
3. Calculates response using data tags
s
Q
σ = gbi mod N
i=1

µ, σ


4. Calculates v and d
5. Verifies if µ * Inverse(

s
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(ri )ti cN ) mod v ≡ 0 and checks if gd mod N = σ.

i=1

Figure 2.5. DMR-PDP scheme using RSA signatures
scheme is secure only if it does not let the cloud cheat the data owner by deleting
file blocks and still pass the challenge/response phase initiated by the data owner.
• Security against forging the response by the adversary : In the
challenge phase, the data owner sends to the CSP, two PRF keys - Key1 , Key2
and a parameter ’c’ which indicates number of file blocks he wishes to verify.
DMR-PDP scheme provides flexiblity to the data owner to send different ’c’
and PRF keys in each challenge phase to the CSP. This ensures that the
response generated by the CSP will not be the same for each challenge sent
by the data owner. This eliminates any opportunity for the CSP to forge
the response without actually calculating it.
• Security against deletion of file blocks with same value : The data
tags generated will be the same for similar file blocks. Though the file blocks
are encrypted, the cloud can identify similar file blocks by identifying tags
with the same value. Cloud can cheat the user by just storing one block and
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deleting similar data blocks. To avoid it, DMR-PDP scheme randomizes
the data before constructing the tags. The data in the tags are added with
random numbers generated from PRF key Keytag . So, even if the data tag
values are the same, the underlying data file block values will not be the
same. For file blocks bi = bj

T ag(bi ) = (H(F ).ubi N +ai )l
T ag(bj ) = (H(F ).ubj N +aj )l
where ai , aj are the random numbers generated from PRF key Keytag .
Though the data blocks are the same, the generated tags will differ in value.

2.5. MULTIPLE REPLICA FILE VERSION CONTROL SYSTEM (MRFVCS)
MRFVCS is an extension to DMR-PDP scheme to support a basic file
versioning system. The data owner encrypts the data, creates multiple replicas
and stores them on the cloud. When the data is updated, the data files are not
updated directly rather the updates are maintained as deltas. With MRFVCS
the data owner can still use the DMR-PDP scheme to verify that the cloud stores
multiple replicas and the deltas intact.
2.5.1. MRFVCS Construction. The data owner divides the file into
multiple file blocks and generates unique multiple replicas and data tags for the
file blocks. Unique multiple replicas of the file blocks are generated using the
homomorphic probabilistic encryption scheme and the data tags for the file blocks
are generated using the BLS signatures as discussed in Section 3.3. The file block
replicas and the data tags for the file blocks are sent to the cloud. These encrypted
replicas of the file blocks represent the base version of the un-encrypted file blocks.
Any modification done to the latest version of un-encrypted file blocks will result
in a new version of the file blocks. The new version of the file blocks are not stored
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directly on the cloud, and instead, the deltas are stored. Delta is calculated as
the difference between the un-encrypted new version of the file block and the unencrypted base version of the file block. When a particular version of the file blocks
are needed, the data owner requests the cloud to merge the delta blocks with the
base version of the file blocks to get the required version of the file blocks. The
data owner uses a file version table to track the versions of the file blocks. The
table is a small data structure stored on the verifier side to validate the integrity
and consistency of all files and its versions stored by the CSP. New versions of the
file blocks are generated when the data owner performs an update operation on
the file blocks. The data update operation includes inserting new file blocks or
modifying or deleting a few file blocks. Delta blocks are generated only when the
update operation is ’modify’. Once the update operation is done, the file version
table is updated by the data owner. The file version table is maintained only on
the data owner side. Keeping the file version table only on the data owner side
will help the data owner to hide the details of update operations from the CSP.
The file version table consists of five columns: Block Number (BN), Delta Block
Number (DBN), File Version (FV), Block Version (BV), Block Operation (BO).
The BN acts as an indexing to the file blocks. It indicates the physical position
of a block in a data file. The DBN is an indexing to the delta block. If delta does
not exist, the value is stored as ’-’. The FV indicates the version of the entire file
and BV indicates the version of the file block. The BO indicates the operation
done on the file block. The maximum value of FV gives the latest version of the
file and the maximum value of BV for a particular BN gives the latest version
of that particular file block. If no entry of a file block number is found in the
file version table, it means no update operations are done on the base version of
the file block and the file block in the base version and the latest version of the
file are same. When a file block with block number B, file version V, and file
block version Y is modified, the data owner may choose to change the version of
entire file to V+1 or keep the file blocks under the same version. For both these
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cases, a new entry is made in the file version table by the data owner. In first
case, the table entry will be <B, - , V+1, 0, Modify> and for the seond case, the
table entry will be <B, -, V, Y+1, Modify>. The proposed scheme consists of
seven algorithms : Keygen, ReplicaGen, TagGen, Prove, Verify, PrepareUpdate,
ExecUpdate, FileVersionRequest, FileVersionDeliver.
1. (pk,sk) ← KeyGen(). Along with the keys described in section 3.3, the data
owner generates a PRF key Keydata which is used to randomize the file blocks
before encryption.
2. {F’Bi }1≤i≤s ← ReplicaGen (s, FB ). This algorithm is run by the data owner
and it slightly differs from the algorithm described in Section 3.3. In this
algorithm, the data owner randomizes the data before generating multiple
replicas. File blocks are randomized using the random numbers generated
from the PRF key Keydata . For a file FB = {b1 , b2 ,..,bm }, the randomized
file will be F’B , which is {b1 + x1 , b2 + x2 ,..,bm + xm } where FB represents the base version of the file and {xj }1≤j≤m are the random numbers
generated using Keydata . The data owner uses Paillier encryption, a homomorphic probabilistic encryption scheme, to create s replicas of the file FB .
So, F’Bi = {(1+(b1 + x1 )N)(ki ri1 )N , (1+(b2 + x2 )N)(ki ri2 )N ,.., (1+(bm +
xm )N)(ki rim )N }1≤i≤m , where i represents the file copy number, ki represents
the numbers generated from PRF key KeyP RF and rij represents random
number used in Paillier encryption scheme generated from PRF key Keyrand
(discussed in section 3.3).
3. φ ← TagGen (sk, F). This algorithm is run by the data owner and BLS
signatures are used to generate the data tags. The details of this algorithm
are same as discussed in Section 3.3.
4. P ← Prove (FB , F∆ , φ, challenge). This algorithm is run by the CSP. It
takes the replicas of file FB , all delta files F∆ , tags φ and the challenge vector
sent by the data owner as input and returns a proof P. Proof P guarantees
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that the CSP is actually storing s copies of the file FB and all the delta files
F∆ . The data owner uses proof P to verify data integrity. The details of
this algorithm are the same as discussed in Section 3.3.
5. {1, 0} ← Verify (pk, P). This algorithm is run by the data owner. It takes
as input public key pk and the proof P returned from the CSP, and outputs
1 if the integrity of all file copies is correctly verified or 0 otherwise. The
details of this algorithm are same as discussed in Section 3.3.
6. Update ← PrepareUpdate (). This algorithm is run by the data owner to perform any operation on the outsourced file copies stored by the remote CSP.
The output of this algorithm is an Update request. The data owner sends the
Update request to the cloud that will be of the form <IdF , BlockOp, j, bi ’,
φ’>, where IdF is the file identifier, BlockOp corresponds to block operation,
j denotes the index of the file block, bi ’ represents the updated file blocks
and φ’ is the updated tag. BlockOp can be data insertion or modification
or delete operation.
(a) Insertion: An insert operation on any version ’V’ of the file FV means
inserting new file blocks in the file. The data owner decides the version
of the file to which the new file blocks belong, either to current file
version V or to next file version V+1. If the new file blocks are added
to the file version ’V+1’, then ’V+1’ will be the new version of the file.
A new entry is made in the file version table as <BN, - , V or V+1, 0,
Insert>. Since there are no delta blocks, the DBN value is ’-’ and since
the file blocks are new, the BV value is 0.
(b) Modification: Modification is done on the latest version of the file
blocks. The data owner identifies the block numbers of the file blocks
that he wishes to modify and searches the file version table for block
numbers. If no entry is found for a particular block number, the file
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blocks from the base version are downloaded from the cloud. If an entry is found, then the latest version of the file block is identified and
downloaded from the cloud, the file blocks from the base version and
the delta blocks associated with the latest version. The downloaded
blocks are decrypted and added with the delta to get the latest version
of the file blocks. Modify operation is done on the plain text to get the
updated plain text. The data owner calculates the new delta as the
difference between the updated plain text and the plain text belonging
to the base version. Delta is then randomized and then sent to the
cloud. Randomization is required in order to not reveal the delta value
to the cloud. Let M = {bi } where 1 ≤ i ≤ s be the set of file blocks
before the update operation and M’ = {b’i } where 1 ≤ i ≤ s be the file
blocks after the update operation. Deltas ∆M are calculated as {b’i
- bi } where 1 ≤ i ≤ s. Deltas are randomized using random numbers
generated from PRF key Keydata . So, ∆M = {b’i - bi + N - xi } where
1 ≤ i ≤ s. ∆M values are sent to the cloud.
(c) Deletion: A delete operation on any version of the file ’V’ means deleting few file blocks from the file. The data owner can delete the file
blocks from the current version V or delete the file blocks in the next
version of the file which is V+1. The data owner makes an entry in
the file version table <BN, - , V or V+1, 0, Delete>. The result of the
delete operation is just an entry in the file version table while the cloud
does not know anything about the delete operation.
7. (F’, φ’) ← ExecUpdate (F, φ, Update). This algorithm is run by the CSP
where the input parameters are the file copies F, the tags φ, and Update
request (sent by the data owner). It outputs new file copies F’ along with
updated signatures φ’. After any block operation, the data owner runs
the challenge protocol to ensure that the cloud has executed the operations
correctly. The operation in Update request can be modifying a file block or
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inserting a new file block. The data owner does not send any delete requests
to the cloud and so no data blocks will be deleted.
(a) Insertion: New file blocks sent by the data owner are added to the file
F.
(b) Modify: Delta values sent by the data owner are stored on the cloud.
8. FileVersionRequest: The data owner identifies the file blocks of the required
version by checking the file version table and sends a request to the cloud
with the block numbers. The request will be of the form <BN, DBN>. The
DBN is required to get to the required version of the file. If there is no DBN
entry in the file version table, then the request will be <BN, - >.
9. FileVersionDeliver: For all the file block numbers with DBN value ’-’ in
the FileVersionRequest, the base version of the file is delivered to the data
owner. If DBN has a delta file block number, then the cloud encrypts the
deltas with the public key and does a homomorphic addition operation on the
base version of the file blocks to get the file blocks of the version requested by
the data owner. Let ∆M = {b’i - bi + N - xi } where 1 ≤ i ≤ s, be the deltas
associated with the file blocks of the corresponding file version requested by
the data owner. The encrypted deltas E(∆M) is given by {(1+(b’i - bi +
N - xi )N)(r)N }, where r ∈ ZN * is some random number. The cloud then
performs a homomorphic addition operation on the requested file blocks on
the base version of the file.
E(Fv ) = E(Fb ) ∗ E(∆Mv ).
= {(1 + (bi + xi )N )(ki ri )N }∗
{(1 + (b0i − bi + N − xi )N )(r)N }.
= {(1 + (b0i N )(ki ri r)N }.
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The file blocks obtained after the homomorphic addition represents the encrypted file blocks of the version requested by the data owner. The encrypted
file blocks are sent to the data owner and the data owner decrypts the file
blocks to get the version he requested.

2.6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We implemented our scheme and the protocols in C language. We conducted several experiments using the local cloud servers as well as EC2 cloud
instnaces with different configurations. We measured the computation time for
various operations for both the CSP and the user. In addition, we also measured
latency in terms of communication cost. Varying file sizes were considered in these
experiments.
Table 2.1. DMR-PDP Communication cost
Phase
Cost
Challenge
256 bits
Verification 2048 + 160 bits
Update
2048 + 160 bits

Data
Key1 , Key2 , c
µ, σ
bi ’, φ’

From
Owner
Cloud
Owner

To
Cloud
Owner
Cloud

To start with, we conducted several experiments on a system with an Intel(R) Xeon (R) 2.67 GHZ processor and 11 GB RAM running CentOS 6.3. In
our implementation, we use PBC library version 0.5.11. To achieve 80-bit security
parameter, the curve group with 160-bit group order is selcted and the size of
modulus N is 1,024 bits. We utilize the Barreto-Naehrig (BN) [18] curve defined
over prime field GF(p) with |p| = 160 and embedding degree = 12. The data tags
generated are points on this curve and a point on this curve can be represented
by 160 bits. We use SHA algorithm for computing file hash, and PBC library
provides functions to represent the hash values as a point on the curve. The data
owner will have to store three PRF keys of size 128 bit, one secret key for data
tags of size 128 bit and one secret key for data encryption of size 1024 bits. The
communication cost for each phase incurred in this protocol is shown in Table 1.
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(a) CSP computation time

(b) User computation time
Figure 2.6. Computation time comparison

Here, we compare the performance of the DMR-PDP scheme proposed
in this paper with that of the DMC-PDP scheme proposed in [16]. The 1024
bit modulus used for Paillier encryption in this paper is comparable in terms of
security to 128 bit AES encryption used in [16]. Figure 6 shows the CSP and
User computation times for both the schemes using files of sizes 1, 5, 10 and 20
MB with 3 replicas. The DMR-PDP scheme has lower CSP computation time
compared to the DMC-PDP scheme whereas the User computation time for both
the schemes differ only in a 1000th of a second . Both the schemes involve just the
pairing operation in the user verification phase and hence similar User computation
times. Performance of the DMR-PDP scheme is better than that of the DMC-PDP
scheme and improves with increase in file size.
The CSP and User computation costs incurred during the response phase
of the proposed scheme is depicted in Figure 7.a and 8.a for 1, 5, 10 and 20 MB
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(a) CSP computation time for BLS signatures

(b) CSP computation time for RSA signatures
Figure 2.7. CSP computation time comparison for the number of replicas on the
local cloud servers
files with 2KB encrypted file block size. Figure 7.a shows the computation time
in seconds on the local cloud servers for different number of replicas. For the
DMR-PDP scheme the User verification phase involves only one heavy pairing
operation and the user computation time is independent of the number of replicas
and the file size as shown in Figure 8.a. It has been reported in [1] that if the
remote server is missing a fraction of the data, then the number of blocks that
needs to be checked in order to detect server misbehavior with high probability
is constant and is independent of the total number of file blocks. For example, if
the server deletes 1% of the data file, the verifier only needs to check for c = 460
randomly chosen blocks of the file so as to detect this misbehavior with probability
larger than 99%. Therefore, in our experiments, we use c = 460 to achieve a high
probability of assurance.
Figures 7.b and 8.b show the CSP and the User computation times on the
local cloud servers when RSA signatures are used. For better security, we used
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(a) User computation time for BLS signatures

(b) User computation time for RSA signatures
Figure 2.8. User computation time comparison for the number of replicas on the
local cloud servers
N to be of size 1024 bits. From Figure 7.a and Figure 7.b, we notice that, the
CSP computation time for BLS and RSA signatures is almost the same. Figure 8
shows the comparison of User computation times when BLS and RSA signatures
are used. Since user verification of RSA signatures involves only exponentional
operations and does not involve any complex pairing operations, it is faster than
BLS signatures. BLS signatures are better to use with our scheme when compared
with RSA signatures since BLS signatures are shorter. The size of RSA signatures
is equal to the size of RSA modulus. Since the size of RSA modulus we used is
1024 bits, RSA signatures are also of 1024 bits, whereas size of BLS signatures
are just 160 bits. In addition, the BLS construction has the shortest query and
response. Further, in our scheme, the data blocks are of size 128 bytes, and so
the tag size will also be 128 bytes, if RSA signatures are used. This will increase
the communication cost. RSA signatures are useful if the size of the data blocks
is huge. [1] uses RSA signatures because they consider data blocks of size 4 KB.
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(a) Time for Insert and Modify operations

(b) Time for Insert + Modify operations
Figure 2.9. Time for file block insert and modify operations on the local cloud
servers
The data update operations are done on multiple file blocks at a time by
the data owner. The update operation includes file block insert, modify, delete
operations in addition to creation of new file tags and their storage on the cloud.
We ran the experiments for file block update on a 1 MB file with 3 replicas
and file block size of 128 bytes. Figure 9.a. shows the combined User and CSP
computation times for file block insert and modify operations, run separately. The
expermients are run by inserting and modifying 1% to 50% number of file blocks.
For example, a file of size 1 MB has 8192 file blocks. The computation times are
calculated by inserting 1% (≈ 82 file blocks) to 50% (4096 file blocks) new file
blocks and modifying 1% (≈ 82 file blocks) to 50% (4096 file blocks) of 8192 file
blocks. Figure 9.b. shows the computation times when the data owner runs both
insert and modify operations on a percentage of file blocks. We notice that modify
operations take much less time when compared to insert operations. The time
taken for modify operation depends on the time taken for paillier multiplication

55

of two 256 byte encrypted file blocks whereas the time taken for insert operation
depends on the time taken for writing the 256 byte encrypted file blocks on to the
hard drive. We do not calculate the time taken for the file block delete operation
since the delete operation does not involve any real User and CSP computations.

(a) CSP computation time on EC2 micro instance

(b) CSP computation time on EC2 large instance
Figure 2.10. CSP computation time for number of replicas on Amazon EC2
instances
We also ran our experiments on a micro and large instance in the Amazon
EC2 cloud. We used a 64-bit Ubuntu OS with 25GB storage for the micro and
large EC2 instances. A micro instance has 613 MB RAM and uses up to 2 EC2
Compute Units whereas a large instance has 7.5GB RAM and uses 4 EC2 Compute
Units. Figure 10 shows the comparison of CSP computation times in micro and
large instances on the EC2 cloud. We notice that the experiments run a lot faster
on the EC2 large instance when compared to the micro instance. EC2 provides
instances which have higher configuration than the large instance and the data
owner can use them to get better performance. The user computation time is
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independent of the CSP. We calculated it on the local CentOS 6.3 machine which
is shown in Figure 8.a. Figures 11 and 12 show the CSP computation times for
insert and modify operations on micro and large EC2 instances. It is found that
the performance of the update operation is a little faster in large instance when
compared to the micro instance. Downloading and uploading file blocks to EC2
micro and large instances take almost the same time. Figure 13 shows the times
to download and upload file blocks to EC2 instances.

(a) Time for Insert and Modify operations

(b) Time for Insert + Modify operations
Figure 2.11. Time for file block insert and modify operations in Amazon EC2
micro instance
We also implemented the basic file versioning system ’MRFVCS’. A file
version table is created by the data owner to track the data updates. The number
of entries in this table depends on the number of dynamic file block operations
performed on the data. The file updates are stored as deltas in the cloud. The
delta files generated are of size 128 bytes. To get a particular version of the file,
the data owner sends ’FileVersionRequest’ to the cloud with two parameters <BN,
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DBN>. After receiving ’FileVersionRequest’, the cloud executes ’FileVersionDeliver’ algorithm. For a FileVersionRequest with DBN value ’-’, the file blocks with
block number BN are directly delivered to the data owner and does not involve
any CSP computation time. For FileVersionRequest with a valid DBN value, the
cloud encrypts the file blocks with block number DBN and does a homomorphic
addition operation with file blocks with block number BN. The experiments are
run on a 1 MB file on local, Amazon EC2 micro and large instances.

(a) Time for Insert and Modify operations

(b) Time for Insert + Modify operations
Figure 2.12. Time for file block insert and modify operations in Amazon EC2
large instance
Figure 14 shows the time taken by the CSP on various instances for executing ’FileVersionDeliver’ algorithm when a number of FileVersionRequests with
valid DBN values is sent by the data owner. We considered FileVersionRequests
only with valid DBN values since there is no computation time involved for delivering file blocks with DBN value ’-’. The number of FileVersionRequests in
Figure 14 is represented in terms of percentage of file blocks. For example, a
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1 MB file has 8192 file blocks of size 128 bytes. When the data owner sends 81
FileVersionRequests, the CSP encrypts 81 delta blocks (1% of 8192 file blocks) and
performs 81 homomorphic addition operations. So any number of FileVersionRequests will lead to the CSP performing operations on those number of file blocks
and FileVersionRequests can be represented in terms of number of file blocks.
MRFVCS does not involve any computation on the part of the data owner side
for executing FileVersionDeliver algorithm and the only cost for the data owner is
for maintaining the file version table.
The CSP computation time for executing FileVersionDeliver algorithm in
MRFVCS is much less compared to the time taken for update operations in the
DMR-PDP scheme.

Figure 2.13. Download and Upload time to EC2 Micro and Large Instances

Figure 2.14. CSP computation time comparison for FileVersionDeliver algorithm
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2.7. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a scheme for validating the replicated
data integrity in a cloud environment. The scheme called Dynamic Multi-Replica
Provable Data Possession scheme (DMR-PDP) periodically verifies the correctness
and completeness of multiple data copies stored in the cloud. Our scheme considers
dynamic data update operations on data copies in the verification process. All
the data copies can be decrypted using a single decryption key, thus providing
a seamless access to all the datas authorized users. The experimental results
using the local as well as EC2 cloud instances show that this scheme is better
than the previous proposed scheme in terms of dynamic data operations which are
performed in much lesser time. In addition, we showed that our scheme works well
when extended to support the multiple file versioning where only deltas are stored
in the cloud which saves storage cost to the data owner. We believe that these
results will help the data owner to negotiate with the cloud provider about the
cost and the performance guarantees while maintaining the integrity of the data.
Also, these results will provide various incentives to the cloud to take appropriate
steps, such as running computations in parallel, to deliver good performance.
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SECTION

3. CONCLUSION

In this work, we have presented a scheme for validating the replicated
data integrity in a cloud environment. The scheme called Dynamic Multi-Replica
Provable Data Possession scheme (DMR-PDP) periodically verifies the correctness
and completeness of multiple data copies stored in the cloud. Our scheme considers
dynamic data update operations on data copies in the verification process. All
the data copies can be decrypted using a single decryption key, thus providing
a seamless access to all the datas authorized users. The experimental results
using the local as well as EC2 cloud instances show that this scheme is better
than the previous proposed scheme in terms of dynamic data operations which are
performed in much lesser time. In addition, we showed that our scheme works well
when extended to support the multiple file versioning where only deltas are stored
in the cloud which saves storage cost to the data owner. We believe that these
results will help the data owner to negotiate with the cloud provider about the
cost and the performance guarantees while maintaining the integrity of the data.
Also, these results will provide various incentives to the cloud to take appropriate
steps, such as running computations in parallel, to deliver good performance.
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